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TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF FREE
EXPRESSION IN RUSSIA: THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUB-NATIONAL COURTS, AND
INTERSYSTEMIC ADJUDICATION
Robert B. Ahdieh & H. ForrestFlemming*

ABSTRACT
Protection offree expression in Russia is headed the wrong direction,
but one institution may still be able to slow its backward slide: the Russian
judiciary. In particular,sub-nationalcourts-those operatingat the ground
level-have the potential to shape a renewed jurisprudence of free
expression in Russia. To encourage as much, the European Court ofHuman
Rights (ECHR) should engage the Russian courts in a pattern of
"intersystemic adjudication,"pressing them to embrace ideas about the role
of courts, the law, human rights, and free expression more in line with
international norms. Hopefully, this can reverse Russia's current path
toward the suppression offree expression.
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INTRODUCTION

Even as its status as a fundamental right spread across the globe in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, free expression failed to establish any
meaningful foothold in Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union. Following
Russia's independence, its advance was episodic at best. And of late, even
that limited progress has been threatened.
To all but the most forgiving observers of Russia today, the protection
of free expression is heading in the wrong direction. Crackdowns on public
protests, limitations on religious freedom,2 the assassination of journalists, 3
legislative initiatives to limit the critique of government officials,4

1
Russian police arrested hundreds of protestors the night before Vladimir Putin's
inauguration in late 2012. Afterwards, new legislation increased penalties for unauthorized
protests. See Michael Birnbaum, A Year into Russia Crackdown, Protestors Try Again,
WASH. POST (May 5, 2013), http://js.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-year-into-russiacrackdown-protesters-try-again/2013/05/05/b7c35870-b5a4- lle2-b94cb684dda07addstory.html.
2 See, e.g., Matthew Brunwasser, Extremism Law Curbs Religious Freedom in Russia,
MATTHEWBRUNWASSER.COM (July 10, 2012),
http://matthewbrunwasser.com/index.php/2012/07/extremism-law-curbs-religious-freedomin-russial (reporting on the negative impact of an anti-extremism law on the religious freedom
of worshipers in St. Petersburg).
See, e.g., Michael Schwirtz, JournalistIs Shot Dead in Russia's North CaucasusRegion,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/world/europe/joumalist-isshot-dead-in-russias-north-caucasus-region.html.
4 Putin signed a law in 2012 broadly defining treason, leading critics to warn that it could
be used to stifle dissent. Russia Treason: PutinApproves Sweeping New Law, BBC (Nov. 14,
2012, 5:08 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20323547.
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significant constraints on independent media outlets, and other curtailments
of free expression have received widespread attention-both in Russia and
around the world. For all that discussion, however, the country's journey
away from the freedom of expression has not only continued but even
accelerated.
Some might see this trend as irreversible. The influence of the Putin
regime at every level of government in Russia, and across the social and
economic order,6 suggests little by way of a political backstop to the
Meanwhile, Russia's nongrowing limitation of free expression.
governmental sector is in wholesale decline, to the extent it even continues
to function.
Surveying this bleak landscape, one institution that might still be able to
slow Russia's backward slide is the Russian judiciary. In particular,
systematically engaged and empowered sub-national courts have the
capacity to shape a renewed jurisprudence of free expression in Russiaprecisely where the rubber hits the road.
Realization of this capacity begins at the opposite end of the judicial
spectrum. By all accounts, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
stands at the apex among courts in the protection of free expression.7 In
what follows, we offer a strategy to use the power and influence of the
ECHR to reverse Russia's path towards the suppression of free expression.
By recognizing both the reality of and potential for "intersystemic
adjudication"-a robust form of engagement of courts across jurisdictional
lines-the ECHR may effectively press Russia's sub-national courts to
embrace ideas about the role of courts, the law, human rights, and free
expression that are more closely aligned with international norms.
Of course, any solution to the dilemma of free expression in Russia will
ultimately involve the courts at the top of its judicial pyramid as well: the
Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and perhaps even the Supreme

See Corey Flintoff, Signs ofA Media Crackdown Emerge in Russia, NPR (Feb. 20, 2012,
12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/20/147052681/signs-of-a-media-crackdown-emergein-russia.
6 See generally Putin's Russia: Repression Ahead, ECONOMIST (June 1, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/ 2 1578716-vladimir-putins-crackdown-opponentsprotesters-and-activist-groups-may-be-sign-fragility.
See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19
EUR. J. INT'L L. 125, 125 (2008) ("The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is the
crown jewel of the world's most advanced international system for protecting civil and
political liberties.").
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Arbitrazh Court. We do well, however, to concentrate particular attention on
the lower courts-especially with reference to the freedom of expression.
Russia's lower courts are critical to changing the norms of free expression in
the country, both because they hear questions of free expression at the
ground level, and because they have consistently been less engaged with the
international community of courts than Russia's senior judges.8
Intersystemic adjudication offers the opportunity to systemically and
substantively change that.
To establish as much, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly
reviews recent indicators of the decline of free expression in Russia, linking
this pattern to conceptions of law rooted in Soviet legal culture. Part II
describes the role that courts can play in addressing Russia's free expression
challenges, with particular focus on the ECHR and Russia's lower courts.
Part III introduces the concept of intersystemic adjudication, tracing its
origins in and connections to other scholarly approaches to judicial
interaction. Finally, Part IV argues that intersystemic adjudication offers the
most appropriate window into the relationship of the ECHR and Russia's
sub-national courts. Further, it identifies ways that we might enhance the
dynamic of intersystemic adjudication in that relationship, so as to best
encourage a new jurisprudence of free expression in Russia.
I. FREE EXPRESSION IN RUSSIAN LEGAL HISTORY AND CULTURE

By all accounts, the freedom of expression is under siege in the Russian
Federation, from freedom of the press to free assembly and protest, and from
the work of non-governmental organizations to the freedom of religion.
Reporters Without Borders ranks Russia 148 out of 179 nations surveyed
when it comes to journalistic freedom of expression. 9 Human Rights Watch
writes that the Russian government engages in "restriction and censure of
protected expression and the media, and harassment of activists and human
rights defenders." 0 According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 17
journalists were killed in Russia between 2000 and 2009 in retaliation for
published stories, making Russia one of the most dangerous places in the

See infra Part II.B.
9

REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, 2013 WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX: DASHED HOPES

AFTER SPRING

20-24 (2013), available at http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement 2013_gb-

bd.pdf.
10

HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
WORLD
REPORT
396
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf.

(2009),

available

at
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world for journalists.I
Political speech is similarly unprotected. Freedom of speech in Russia
captured international headlines in 2012, with the prosecution and conviction
of three members of the feminist rock band Pussy Riot.12 In advance of the
presidential election that returned Vladimir Putin to the presidency that year,
the band staged an anti-Putin protest in a Moscow cathedral, prompting a
charge of hooliganism. All three of the captured members were convicted,
with two sent to labor camps to serve their sentences.14 On a wider scale,
mass protests like those against Putin in Bolotnaya Square in 2012 have
resulted in mass arrests and prosecutions.
And, as with Pussy Riot,
Russian courts have largely gone along, convicting protesters as a matter of
course.
Russian legislators have likewise done their part to limit the freedom of
expression. In June 2012, just a month after his inauguration, President
Putin endorsed new legislation imposing hefty fines on participants in
unsanctioned demonstrations.16 That same month, the Russian parliament
enacted three other laws impinging on free expression. The first imposed
limits on internet use, another limited the activity of non-governmental
organizations, and the third criminalized defamation.17 These moves,
alongside the government's significant control of the press, create substantial
barriers to free expression in Russia.
Such impositions on free expression, however, are not new to Russia.
The freedoms of speech, of press, and of assembly have consistently been
limited under the tsars, Communist rule, and Russia's post-Soviet leadership.

See COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, ANATOMY OF INJUSTICE: THE UNSOLVED KILLINGS

OF JOURNALISTS INRUSSIA 6 (2009), available at

http://cpj.org/reports/CPJ.Anatomy%20of/o201njustice.pdf
12 Reuters, Band Members in Putin Protest Said to Face Harsh Conditions, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/world/europe/imprisoned-pussy-riotmembers-in-harsh-conditions.html.
13

Id.

14

id.

15 Andrew E. Kramer, Thousands in Moscow Rally Against New Trials, N.Y. TIMES (May
6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/world/europe/russian-protest-goes-aheaddespite-volunteers-death.html.
6 Potential fines exceeded $9,000 for individuals, $18,000 for organizers, and $30,000 for
groups. David M. Herszenhorn, New Russian Law Assesses Heavy Fines on Protesters,N.Y.
TIMES (June 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/europe/putin-signs-lawwith-harsh-fines-for-protesters-in-russia.html.
17 Poel Karp, Why Russia Needs a Defamation Law... a Proper One, OPENDEMOCRACY

(Aug. 3, 2012), www.opendemocracy.net/print/67389.
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That history, meanwhile, has helped to enshrine a legal culture-and a
particular conception of law's role in society-that represent the greatest
obstacle to change.
Early in the Bolshevik Revolution, the law was seen in a harsh light.
Consistent with Marxist theory, the rule of law was seen as the rule of the
ruling class.18 Law was thus little more than another tool by which the
ruling class could exert power over the masses and maintain its position at
the top of the political and economic order.
Given as much, the
revolutionaries looked forward to a withering away of the law, along with
the state, as communism was perfected in the new Soviet Union.19
Perhaps predictably, the idealism of this thinking did not persist for
long. One of the very first decrees issued after the Revolution concerned the
operation of the judicial system.
Just one year later, the new government
issued an important decree on strict observance of the rule of law.21 Still,
there existed a certain equilibrium of respect for and distrust of the rule of
law in the earliest days of communist rule.22 Law continued to be seen as a
means of bourgeoisie influence, yet it was also understood as an essential
tool
of
effective
governance.
By the 1930s, however, this balance was abandoned, as Josef Stalin
established his authority over the Soviet state. In place of a withering away
of the law, there emerged a virulent legal instrumentalism, in which law was,
first and foremost, a tool of state power.23 In many respects, this dynamic
arose out of the work of Andrei Vyshinsky, a firm believer in the power of
law and Stalin's chief prosecutor. Led by Vyshinsky, the Great Purge of
Stalin's competitors for authority and influence within the Communist Party
took the particular form of the infamous "show trials." 24 Widely publicized,
these proceedings sought to give the appearance of due process to what were

18

See Evgeny Pashukanis, The Marxist Theory of State and Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS
273 (Piers Beirne & Robert Sharlet eds., Peter B. Maggs trans., 1980).

ON MARXISM AND LAW
I9
20

Id.

This was the Decree No. I on Courts.

SAMUEL KUCHEROV, THE ORGANS OF SOVIET

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THEIR HISTORY AND OPERATION 21-25

(1970).

21

This was the Decree No. 2 on Courts. Id. at 35-38.

22

ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS

1985-1996, at 15 (1997).
Molly Warner Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Role for ConstitutionalLaw in Soviet
Disunion, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 41, 72-73 (1994).
24
See Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Kremlin's Eye: The 21st Century Prokuraturain the
ANDTHETRANSITION TODEMOCRACY
23

Russian AuthoritarianTradition,45

STAN.

J. INT'L L. 1, 6-7 (2009).
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essentially decisions to eliminate political enemies.25 They did so, however,
at the expense of public (and governmental) conceptions of law.
Adoption of Stalin's 1936 constitution offered further confirmation of
this legal instrumentalism. No longer would law be avoided or ignored, let
alone abandoned. Henceforth, law would emerge as one of the critical-and
perhaps the most important-instruments of Soviet power, both in rhetoric
and in practice.26 Law would thus come to function as a social, political,
and economic constraint on individuals and institutions, rather than a tool to
protect the citizenry from one another, let alone the state. 27
In the ensuing decades, this conception of law would come to be
ingrained in the mindset of both the subjects and practitioners of law in the
Soviet Union.28 In particular, given the bureaucratic structure of judicial
promotion in the country,29 it was instilled in each new generation of judges,
as a matter of culture and belief. Even with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
in fact, this statist conception of law persisted in critical ways. Beyond
Moscow and Russia's highest courts, there is limited notion-at best-of
law as a source of individual rights. More troubling, perhaps especially with
regard to free expression, the conception of it as a tool of constraint has not
yet been purged, perhaps particularly in the lower courts.30 Changing the
conception of law in Russia's lower courts will thus be central to any
effective response to the crisis of free expression in Russia.
II. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

In light of the broad range of challenges to free expression in Russia
today, any meaningful response must integrate a diversity of strategies. It is
equally clear, however, that any such response must rely heavily on the
courts. Courts are uniquely situated to protect the freedom of expression.
As the ultimate arbiters of the law's structure, it falls to them to define the
scope of free expression. Courts are also naturally positioned to redress
violations of freedom of expression, given the ordinary commission of such

25

See id.

AHDIEH, supra note 22, at 15-16, 97-98.
See Lien, supra note 23, at 74-75.
28 See id. at 80-81.
29 See Greenberg, supra note 24, at 34-35 (arguing that the bureaucracy of the
Kremlin has
imposed its will on the judicial system).
30 See Yulia Demovsky, Note, Overcoming Soviet Legacy: Non-Enforcement
of the
Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights by the Russian Judiciary, 17 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 471 (2009).
26

27
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violations by the political branches of government, rather than by the
courts. 3 1
In this Part, we review the judicial institutions relevant to protecting the
freedom of expression in Russia and consider the role they have playedand might potentially play-in that process. First, we describe the European
Court of Human Rights and its connection to the human rights jurisprudence
of Russia and other members of the Council of Europe. We then turn to the
Russian judiciary and consider its role in protecting the freedom of
expression, with particular emphasis on Russia's sub-national courts.
a.

The European Court ofHuman Rights

Since World War II, the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms has been the fulcrum of human rights protection in
Europe. Among members of the Council of Europe, the Convention
guarantees certain core rights, including the freedom of expression, freedom
of assembly, and freedom of association.32 Signatories to the European
Convention are required to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction"
these rights and freedoms. 33 In 1998, Russia ratified the Convention and
34
accepted this obligation.
The European Court of Human Rights serves as the judicial branch of
the European Convention and exercises jurisdiction over all members of the
Council of Europe.35 Headquartered in Strasbourg, France, it is comprised
of judges appointed by each member state, making it the largest
supranational tribunal in the world.36 Sitting in chambers of seven judges,
ECHR judges hear cases brought by member states, as well as by individual
citizens challenging actions of their home country. 37 Individual petitioners
31 To be sure, courts are often themselves the source of rights' violations.

See Helfer,
supra note 7, at 158. Even as to those circumstances, I would argue the engagement proposed
herein is likely to have a salutary influence.
32 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms arts. 10-11, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].
13 Id. art. I.
34 Wrede Smith, Note, Europe to the Rescue: The Killing ofJournalists in Russia and the
EuropeanCourt ofHuman Rights, 43 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 493, 510 (2011).
3
Convention, supra note 32, art. 19.
36 The organization of the Court is complex. See id. art. 26(b); see generally Paul L.
McKaskle, The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It Works, and Its Future,
40 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (2005) (describing how the Court is split into four "sections," each with
its own president, and elaborating on the role of these sections).
37 Convention, supra note 32, arts. 33-34.
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must have exhausted available remedies in their home jurisdiction, however,
before bringing their claims to the ECHR. 38
The primary remedy ECHR provides is declaratory relief. In these
circumstances, the Court simply declares that the member state has violated
one or more rights guaranteed by the European Convention. The Court can
also provide damages, however, in appropriate cases. 39 This relief takes the
form of "just satisfaction"-granted where the Court finds that the applicant
has sustained injury as a result of the member state's violation.40 In recent
years, the Court has also shown willingness to demand more specific
remedies from member states, including the reopening of proceedings,
alterations of domestic law, and the return of seized property.4 1
The enforcement of ECHR judgments falls largely to individual member
states.42 Because the ECHR has limited enforcement mechanisms of its
own, the cooperation of member states is essential to its integrity. 43 Yet the
Court is not completely without power to encourage execution of its
judgments. In various ways, the Court may publicly encourage a member
state to provide applicants with an effective remedy.
The Court may thus
seek to "shame" member states into providing relief.45 Such shaming may
extend beyond the Court, moreover, as other member states join a chorus of
pressure on non-compliant states.4 6 At the other extreme, disregard of the
Court could ultimately lead to expulsion from the Council of Europe.
Since Russia ratified the European Convention in 1998, it has submitted
to the urisdiction of the ECHR, strained as that relationship has sometimes
been. As a formal matter, Russia's obligation to apply the Convention and

" Id. art. 35(1). The judge appointed by the member state being challenged always serves
on the panel deciding the relevant case. Id. art. 26.
"Id. art. 4 1.
40 Id.
41 Helfer, supra note 7, at 147.
42 MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN
RIGHTS

43

4-6 (2007).

Cf Helfer, supra note 7, at 158.

Id.
Id. at 153, 158.
46 For example, both the ECHR and other member states were highly critical of Russia's
delay in signing Protocol 14 of the Convention, as such measures must be ratified
unanimously by member states to take effect. See Jennifer W. Reiss, Recent Development,
ProtocolNo. 14 ECHR and Russian Non-ratification:The CurrentState of Affairs, 22 HARV.
4

45

HUM. RTS. J. 293, 293-95 (2009).

47

See generally Julia Lapitskaya, Note, ECHR, Russia, and Chechnya: Two is Not
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accept the ECHR's interpretations of it is clear. Under Article 15 of the
Constitution of the Russian Federation, thus, international treaties are
integrated into Russian domestic law.48 Indeed, they sit in a position of
superiority to domestic statutory law, when the two conflict.
On the other hand, as one commentator has suggested:
Russia violates the spirit and letter of the [European Convention] by
ignoring the substance of the ECHR judgments, failing to implement
measures that are necessary to punish wrongdoers and prevent
human rights violations in the future, and engaging in techniques,
including intimidation of human rights applicants, attorneys, and
activists, that are designed to dissuade Russian nationals, including
Chechen residents, from accessing the ECHR. 49
This disregard is no small matter. In 2011, over 14,000 ECHR complaints
were filed against Russia-nearly 6,000 more than the next most challenged
member state, Turkey. 50
If the ECHR is to play a meaningful role in the protection of free
expression in Russia, this relationship must obviously change.51 Unlikely as
that may seem, two recent decisions offer reason for hope.
In 2010, after several years of delay, Russia became the last member of
the Council of Europe to ratify Protocol 14 to the European Convention. 52
With that decision, the path was paved for a significant strengthening of the
ECHR's procedures, to allow it to work through its backlog of cases and
Company and Three is Definitely a Crowd, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 479 (2011).
48

KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15 (Russ.); see

generally, Anton Burkov, Impact of the Conventionfor the ProtectionofHuman Rights and
FundamentalFreedoms on the Russian Legal System, in EU-RuSSIA LEGAL COOPERATION 30

(2010), availableat http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wpcontent/uploads/2008/10/EURCReviewXIV english.pdf (elaborating on these
constitutional provisions and their interpretation as they related to the ECHR in particular).
49

Lapitskaya, supra note 47, at 480.

50

EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN FACTS &

FIGURES

10

(2011),

available

at

http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts Figures_2011 ENG.pdf.
51 See William E. Pomeranz, Russia and the European Court of Human Rights:
Implications
for
US.
Policy,
WILSON
CENTER,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russia-and-the-european-court-human-rightsimplications-for-us-policy (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (arguing that cooperation with the
ECHR is strictly limited to financial compensations and that Russia refuses to adopt policies
recommended by the Court).
52 Robert Bridge, Russia Ratifies Protocol 14 on Human Rights Court Reform, RT (Jan.
15, 2010, 12:10), http://rt.com/politics/russia-ratifies-protocol- 14/.
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thereby increase its effectiveness as a tribunal. 53
Even more critically for present purposes, in February 2010, the Russian
Constitutional Court issued a judgment mandating enactment of legislation
to create a mechanism for the effective execution of ECHR decisions. Such
a mechanism of redress, the Constitutional Court held, was a bindin
obligation on the Russian parliament under the European Convention.
Further, the Constitutional Court mandated amendment of the Russian Code
of Civil Procedure, to incorporate a mechanism for reconsidering cases when
mandated by the ECHR. 55
b.

The Russian Courts

For all its potential as a supranational human rights tribunal, the ECHR
represents only half of the picture in any effort to use the courts to protect
free expression in Russia. Russia's own courts have at least as important a
role to play.
The judiciary of Russia comprises three main court systems:
commercial courts, courts of general jurisdiction, and the Constitutional
Court. Presiding over the commercial courts -whose jurisdiction extends
to fiscal and business disputes between and among both public and private
institutions-is the Supreme Arbitrazh Court. 57 Atop the generalist courts
sits the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which "has the ultimate
judicial responsibility for civil, criminal, administrative, and other cases
from general jurisdiction courts."5 8 The Supreme Court is thus the ultimate
arbiter of non-constitutional questions, exercisin appellate authority over
district and regional courts of general jurisdiction.
Most important among the three high courts when it comes to free
expression is the Constitutional Court. Standing on its own, without lower
courts below it, the Constitutional Court is charged (among other things)
with hearing cases from citizens that implicate constitutional rights and
liberties.60 The Constitutional Court is the ultimate interpreter of the

5

See Reiss, supra note 46.
Burkov, supra note 48, at 33.

54
55

id.

56

See RICHARD

J. TERRILL, WORLD CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A SURVEY

419-32 (7th ed.

2009).
7 See id. at 431.
58 Id. at 424.
59 id.
60 KONSTITUTSIIA RoSSIISKOf FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION]

art. 125 (Russ.).
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Russian constitution, and its decisions constitute binding precedents akin to
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.61 One commentator has thus
described the Constitutional Court as "so lar e, powerful, and productive
that it could be treated as a separate judiciary."
Much has been written on the role of Russia's high courts, especially the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, in the protection of human
rights.63 Those courts are well connected with what Anne-Marie Slaughter
has termed the "global community" of courts.64 Their judges sit on panels
with judges from other nations and are aware of, and even engage, opinions
of the high courts of those nations. Russia's high court judges thus count
other high court judges as their peers and are influenced by their views,
values, and practices. This dynamic extends beyond other national courts,
moreover, to the ECHR as well. Both the Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court thus regularly invoke the case law of the ECHR in their
decisions.6 5
There are, to be sure, significant limits to the relationship of Russia's
high courts with the ECHR. If the former fully embraced the judgments of
the latter, the protection of free expression would be far less of a concern in
Russia than it is today.66 Compared to Russia's lower courts, however, the
high courts are far more aware of and engaged with supranational and
foreign courts, and with their foundational values.

See generally Ekaterina Mouliarova, The Role of ConstitutionalJustice in Russia in the
Process of Interpretation of European Values and the Promotion of European
Constitutionalism (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper MWP 2010/04, 2010), available at
http://cadmus.eui.euIbitstream/handle/1814/13344/MWP_2010_04.pdfsequence=1.
62 Todd Foglesong, The Dynamics of Judicial (In)dependence in Russia, in JUDICIAL
61

INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE

64 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O'Brien eds., 2001)
e.g., Stephen Breyer, Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalization:
Relationships
Among European Constitutional Courts, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045
Changing
(2000); Jeffrey Kahn, Note, Russian Compliance with Articles Five and Six of the European
Convention of Human Rights as a Barometer of Legal Reform and Human Rights in Russia,
35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 641 (2002).
6
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 711 (1998)
(describing a "global community" of judges engaged in dialogue about shared social,
economic, and legal challenges).
Kahn, supra note 63, at 662. But see Burkov, supra note 48, at 34 (arguing that the
Supreme Court only rarely invokes the ECHR).
66 See Helfer, supra note 7, at 133. Although Russia frequently pays ECHR monetary
judgments, it is unwilling to remedy more systemic issues addressed by ECHR judgments.
See Dernovsky, supra note 30, at 489.
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Lower courts in Russia thus interact with the international community
of courts with dramatically less frequency than the high courts. In an apt
example, lower court judges have largely disregarded judgments of the
ECHR in their own adjudication of disputes.67
Their operative
"community," by contrast with the high courts, consists almost exclusively
of the Russian bench and bar. Given as much, their mindset has tended to
remain more grounded in the instrumental conception of law described in
Part I.68

The lived experience of the law for Russia's lower court judges,
meanwhile, is as an instrument of governance, rather than as a tool to protect
citizens' rights.69 As a result, they are more likely to accept the suppression
of free expression in the service of governmental imperatives.70 Because of
their lack of engagement with international legal values, this mindset has
defined their jurisprudence. 7 1
Yet Russia's lower courts have a crucial role to play in the protection of
free expression. Battles over the freedom of expression are first fought in
the lower courts.72 It is at that stage that the complexities of free speech and
free association can be most readily negotiated. Courts engaged with the
facts of the case and the principals of the underlying dispute are thus best
positioned to reach results that effectively balance the demands of law
enforcement, national security, and the prevailing politics with the dictates
of free expression.
Engaging the demands of free expression in the lower courts is also
essential, given the failure of the overwhelming majority of cases to reach
the high courts-whether for reasons of cost, delay, or otherwise. 73 Appeal
to the ECHR, meanwhile, is available only after all domestic options for
recovery have been exhausted. 74 Any robust protection of free expression in
Russia must therefore involve a change at the level of the lower courts,
rather than necessarily long-delayed judgments of the high courts or the

67 Lapitskaya, supra note 47, at 495; see also Helfer, supra note 7, at 137.
68 See supra Part I.
69

See id.

70 See Dernovsky, supra note 30, at 474-76.

Exacerbating this situation is the fact that lower court judges most often have lesser
education than their high court counterparts. As a result, they have likely had lesser indirect
exposure to international legal norms as well.
72 Cf Helfer, supra note 7, at 156.
" Id at 133.
74 Convention, supra note 32, art. 35.
71
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ECHR.7 5
Finally, emphasis on the lower courts may also be important for Russian
legal culture more generally. For the overwhelming majority of Russia's
citizens, any interaction with the judiciary will come via the lower courts.
Whatever they may read of the decisions of the Supreme Court or the
Constitutional Court, it is the legal culture of the lower courts that they are
most likely to observe-and embrace.
III. FROM JUDICIAL DIALOGUE TO INTERSYSTEMIC ADJUDICATION

Having described the role of the ECHR in advancing human rights in
Europe and suggested the relevance of the lower courts to any sustainable
effort to do so in Russia, one might consider the role that engagement
between these institutions could play in furthering that cause. In a growing
body of academic work, scholars have explored the engagement of courts
across jurisdictional lines.
For the most part, this analysis has approached such cross-jurisdictional
interaction as a kind of voluntary "dialogue." 76 For some, this dialogue is
simply a source of judicial community. For others, it constitutes a critical
means to disseminate international norms to judges in those jurisdictions that
operate outside those norms.
The framework of "intersystemic adjudication" draws on this literature
but offers an account of judicial engagement that may better capture the
interaction of the ECHR and the lower Russian courts. Rather than pure
dialogue, intersystemic adjudication focuses on the need for each court to
attend to decisions of the other. Perhaps for that very reason, it suggests a
bi-directional pattern of learning, rather than the dissemination of values
defined by one judicial system to the other.
In what follows, we begin with a brief introduction to the literature of
judicial dialogue generally. We then consider important work of Larry
Helfer on the potential "embeddedness" of ECHR judgments in the politics

7s The backlog of cases in the ECHR makes the need for effective relief in the Russian
courts even more obvious. See infra Part Ill.
76 See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogueand Decree: InternationalReview of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2029, 2050 (2004) (addressing the literature focusing on
the dialogic aspects ofjudicial interactions).
7 Early work by Anne-Marie Slaughter discussed the international community of courts in
great detail. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication,29
U. RICH. L. REv. 99 (1994).
78 See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 7, at 131-33.

Toward a JurisprudenceofFreeExpression in Russia

45

and jurisprudence of member states. Finally, we describe the theory of
intersystemic adjudication, as well as the scholarly framework from which it
is derived.
a.

JudicialDialogue

One influential framework for thinking about the interaction of courts is
"transnational legal process," an approach directed primarily to state actors'
relationship with international law. 79 In its genesis, transnational legal
process derives from the question of why nations obey international law.
The answer, as posited by Harold Koh, may lie in the interaction of actors
"in a variety of fora[,] to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately internalize
rules of international law.,,80
The goal of transnational legal process, as such, is to foster interactions
among actors that will encourage the internalization of international law
"into the domestic law of even resistant nation states."8 1 This approach, it is
hoped, will encourage the voluntary embrace of transnational norms-with
attendant benefits in terms of compliance. Transnational legal process does
not encompass courts alone, however, but the entire universe of "public and
private actors including nation-states, international organizations,
multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and private
individuals."82 Such broad engagement and dialogue, transnational legal
process promises, leads nation-states to internalize international norms and
to comply with them more consistently. 83
The framework of transnational "networks" constitutes another rubric
for analyzing judicial dialogue. As explored by Anne-Marie Slaughter, such
networks are comprised of state actors drawn from multiple jurisdictions. 84
These individuals are bound together, in turn, by one or more shared goals or
concerns-usually an issue of global character requiring engagement across
jurisdictional lines. Such transnational networks operate below the highest

79 Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1502
(2003).
so

Id.

SI

Id.

82 Harold Hongju Koh, Why do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599,
2626 (1997).
83 Id.; see also Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75
NEB. L. REV. 181,

203-06 (1996).
84

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 167-68 (2004).
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levels of government, however, with agency or departmental representatives
in particular subject-matter areas-or individual judges-as their members.
Already widespread, Slaughter argues that such networks will only grow in
importance over time, ultimately emerging as the framework of global
governance. 86
Finally, in analyzing the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Joseph
Weiler explored a pattern of judicial dialogue by which the ECJ was able to
significantly enhance its role and to promote the project of Europe more
generally. In Weiler's account, Europe emerged in no small part out of the
interaction of the ECJ with the sub-national courts of the European
Community's member states. The latter courts, before rendering their own
judgments on national legal questions implicated by European law, turned to
the ECJ with preliminary references on the questions presented-seeking
advance judgments of a sort. In this way, the sub-national courts of Europe
came to be actively engaged in the administration and application of
European law. Through this trans-judicial dialogue, in turn, European values
came to be enshrined in the jurisprudence of the nations of Europe. 89
b.

Embeddedness and the ECHR

Building on the foregoing work, Larry Helfer has explored the role of
ECHR judgments at the national level and how that role might be
enhanced.9 0 Helfer offers high Rraise for the ECHR, calling it the "crown
jewel" of human rights courts.
But he also highlights the tremendous
challenges presented by the Court's huge backlog of cases.92 To address the
latter, Helfer posits the need to better "embed" the judgments and underlying
values of the ECHR in member states. 93
At base, Helfer's concept of "embeddedness" speaks to how the ECHR
can most effectively shape national-level human rights norms. More
specifically, embeddedness seeks to achieve this goal by enhancing the place

86

Id

87 J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court ofJustice and its Interlocutors,
26 J. COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 512-16 (1994).
88 Id

89 Id.; see also Helfer, supra note 7, at 140-41 (describing analogous undertakings by the
Italian Constitutional Court, in the early years after its establishment).
90 See Helfer, supra note 7.
9' Id. at 125.
92 Id

93 Id
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of the ECHR's judgments in the political and legal order of relevant states. 94
Where a member state does not adequately protect human rights, Helfer
argues, the Court should decrease the degree of deference given its courts.
Rather, the ECHR should seek to embed itself more forcefully, pressing the
member state to embrace its interpretations and judgments. Such an
assertion of power, coupled with enhanced efforts at persuasion, 95 may allow
the ECHR to more effectively extend the European Convention's values
within the member states.
This more forceful assertion of ECHR human rights norms ceases to be
necessary, however, as a member state embraces the values of the
Convention as its own. As it does so, the ECHR should increase its
deference-with concomitant reductions in the workload of the Court, and in
the burden on the Court to single-handedly protect the rights enshrined in the
Convention.9 6
This process, as Helfer sees it, is not particular to the courts. Helfer's
concern is with national institutions generally, of which courts are just one.97
Once embeddedness takes hold, thus, the constitutional court, other high
courts, the lower courts, the legislature, the executive branch, and others
must all play a part in securing the human rights protections of the European
Convention. Claims in the ECHR will become less necessary, as national
interpretations come into line with those of the ECHR. No less importantly,
however, national legislatures will need to enact the legislation needed to
minimize violations in the first place. 99
As the foregoing suggests, embeddedness largely embraces a unidirectional view of the relationship between the ECHR and national courts.
Although an embeddedness approach recognizes the importance of member
states in the promotion of human rights, thus, it is essentially a framework to

94

Id. at 130.

See id. at 135 (arguing that "it requires the skilful use of persuasion to realign the
interests and incentives of decision-makers in favour of compliance with the tribunals'
judgments. In this sense, diffuse embeddedness is linked to the socializing functions that
international institutions can exert over the behaviour of national actors").
95

Id. at 130.

97 See id at 138-39. Interestingly, Helfer identifies Russia itself as a hindrance to
embeddedness. See id at 157 (Russia, making up 21 percent of the ECHR caseload, "creates
political fault lines that threaten to derail the ECtHR reform process"). Helfer goes on to say
that "[t]he most overt resistance has come from Russia," and that relations between Russia
and the European Council on Human Rights have soured. Id
98 Id at 130.
99 Id. at 133.
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promote the values of the ECHR at the national level. As a result, it engages
less fully than it might with the dependence of the ECHR on national-level
institutions, and does not consider the ways in which the value proposition
of judicial engagement might potentially be one of mutual learning, rather
than something more in the spirit of re-education from above. 0 0
c.

Intersystemic Adjudication

Intersystemic adjudication offers a distinct perspective on the
interaction of courts across jurisdictional lines, which addresses some of the
gaps in the foregoing accounts-and may, as we suggest in Part IV, offer
greater insight into the interaction of the ECHR and member state courts at
all levels, but especially with the lower courts. To understand the core
characteristics of intersystemic adjudication-a hybrid dynamic of vertical
and horizontal interaction, coupled with alternative legal perspectives and a
certain interdependence of the paired systems-it is useful to begin with its
conceptual origins.
1. Dialectical Federalism
Writing more than three decades ago, Robert Cover and Alexander
Aleinikoff observed a pattern of judicial interaction between state courts and
lower federal courts in the United States that they termed "dialectical
federalism."10 1 This interaction arose from the peculiar relationship between
state criminal law and federal habeas corpus review, in which neither state
nor federal courts enjoyed complete independence from the other. State
courts more oriented to "law-and-order" values could attempt to ignore the
jurisprudence of the lower federal courts, imposing the cost of recurrent
habeas review on them. The federal courts, however, could repeatedly
mandate the release of defendants convicted without what they saw as basic
constitutional protections, forcing state courts to re-litigate those cases.102
They could only do so, though, at the cost of a crushing burden of habeas
cases.
In a sense, neither court system enjoyed exclusive authority over the
scope of constitutional criminal procedure and the resulting rights of
100 Id. at 135 ("Thus, if an international tribunal's embeddedness is characterized by its
inclusion in an integrated judicial hierarchy - what I label as 'direct' embeddedness - the
ECHR is not embedded in national legal systems.").
101 Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.1 1035 (1977).
102 Id. at 1052-54.
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criminal defendants. 103 Rather, they were at once partly autonomous of and
partly dependent on one another. Within their relationship, "there [were]
if possible, satisfy
incentives for each court system to acknowledge and,
04
other."'1
the
of
demands
reasonable
some of the more
Lower federal courts hearing habeas claims and state courts trying
criminal defendants were thus forced by their interdependence to pay
attention to each other. Each had to be flexible and seek out ways to
compromise.10 5 State courts considered and sometimes acquiesced to the
interpretations of the federal courts, as did federal courts with state court
interpretations. As Cover and Aleinikoff outline, the result was a dramatic
transformation in the jurisprudence of criminal due process in the United
States, including as to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' 0 6
2. The Elements of Intersystemic Adjudication
Building on the work of Cover and Aleinikoff, intersystemic
adjudication constitutes a further framework through which we might
evaluate interactions among judicial systems. As with dialectical federalism,
the key characteristic of intersystemic adjudication is a dynamic of
Incidents of intersystemic adjudication are further
interdependence.
characterized by a certain mix of vertical- and horizontal-type interactions
The relationship among courts in
between the relevant systems.
intersystemic adjudication thus has some spirit of appellate review to it, with
one system exerting power over the other; but it also has some quality of
voluntary dialogue and comity. Capitalizing on the latter, a further feature

103 Habeas corpus permits post-conviction review of allegedly unlawful detention. See Rex
R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End ofLaw, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1, 51 (2004).
104 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 101, at 1053.

Ahdieh, supra note 76, at 2072.
'06 See id. at 2069-72 (noting Hewett v. North Carolina, in which the Supreme Court
expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and to which state courts voluntarily
acquiesced, and Minnick v. Mississippi, in which the Supreme Court expanded the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination following similar expansion by state and federal
courts). In later work, Aleinikoff has highlighted transnational judicial interactions analogous
to dialectical federalism. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, TransnationalSpaces: Norms and
Legitimacy, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 479 (2008). Courts tend to want to contribute to the systems
of which they are a part. When courts are part of a supranational system, these courts will
seek to be "good citizens." In this way, courts help create law through a "joint venture" of
"negotiation and borrowing." See id. at 488.
105
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of intersystemic adjudication also bears noting: the relevant judicial systems
will ordinarily bring distinct legal perspectives to the table. Each of these
characteristics can be considered in turn.
The interdependence of courts begins with the presence of some overlap
in their jurisdiction. Such overlap, however, is not sufficient on its own.
Rather, the interdependence of intersystemic adjudication arises where the
two systems, though formally independent, are functionally dependent upon
one another. As in the case of the federal and state courts in Cover and
Aleinikoff's account, each entity lacks the ability to fulfill its mission
without cooperation from the other.
When relevant courts are
interdependent, thus, flexibility and compromise become essential.107
Beyond this foundation of interdependence, a key feature of
intersystemic adjudication is a relationship blending elements of both
vertical and horizontal interaction. In a vertical relationship among courts,
there is some necessary element of judicial power. At the extreme, this is
dynamic of appellate review, as in the relationship of the US Supreme Court
to the US Courts of Appeals.los At a minimum, this dynamic of power
might be seen in intersystemic adjudication, in that relevant courts are forced
into a pattern of dialogue and interaction. 109 Beyond that, the vertical
dynamic at work may also play a role in sustaining such interaction, even
when it proves unwelcome to the participating tribunals. Lower courts
cannot ignore higher courts, even when they disagree. For courts engaged in
intersystemic adjudication, such disregard is similarly problematic.
Intersystemic adjudication is not truly appellate in nature, however, but
also includes a certain horizontal dynamic of engagement. The vertical
dimension of judicial power is thus susceptible to resistance.
Some
dimension of dialogue-the judicial comity that Slaughter highlightsi" 0-is
therefore equally essential to a pattern of intersystemic adjudication.
Such dialogue implies a certain degree of voluntariness. At a minimum,
this may help soften the force of the vertical dimension of the
relationship. 1' More importantly, horizontal dialogue may help to foster the
type of relationship observed by Cover and Aleinikoff, in which each system

Aleinikoff, supra note 106, at 488.
108 See Slaughter,supra note 77, at 107-08.
10 See Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 899 (2006).
Something of this spirit might be seen in the operation of embeddedness. See Helfer, supra
107

note 7.

110See Slaughter,supra note 64, at 708-12.
See Ahdieh, supra note 76, at 2052-53.
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actively engages the jurisprudence, and even the values, of the other.
Federal courts engaging the decisions of state courts on habeas review, and
state courts' exploration of the resulting federal jurisprudence, thus
generated a "joint venture" of sorts in the development of constitutional
112
criminal procedure.
If one set of courts embraces the judgments of another in a somewhat in
the spirit of comity, then, they may be significantly more likely to internalize
the values that undergird those judgments-rather than resist them, as they
might in the face of a purely vertical dynamic of engagement. This
voluntary quality of engagement may be especially important, moreover, in
transnational settings. There is, of course, no overarching legal process by
which to meaningfully resolve disputes among independent legal systems.
In this regard, intersystemic adjudication differs from dialectical federalism,
which enjoys the benefit of a Supreme Court, capable of ultimately resolving
any persistent disagreements between the state and lower federal courts.
Both the functionality and legitimacy of the international legal order may
thus benefit from intersystemic adjudication's embrace of the horizontal
elements of judicial dialogue and comity.113 Transnational adjudication may
"require that the courts subject to review not be rendered powerless, as
through a system of ordinary appeal.,,l14
Beyond its blend of vertical and horizontal dimensions of interaction,
intersystemic adjudication is also characterized by the existence of
alternative perspectives. This is the ideological component of the joint
venture described by Cover and Aleinikoff-in which federal courts were
more attuned to constitutional protections, while state courts were more
attentive to law and order. Such divergent perspectives are essential, if
intersystemic adjudication is to offer meaningful opportunities for change.115
Two sources of alternative perspectives among courts might be
highlighted: diversity of law and diversity of institutional context. For the
most part, judicial dialogue is grounded in differences of law-in legal
authorities and interpretation.116 Even within a single nation, varying rules
across state and municipal boundaries give rise to such diversity. This is

112Aleinikoff, supra note 106, at 488; Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 102, at 1052-54.
' See Ahdieh, supra note 76, at 2093.
114 Id.; see also Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 429, 480 (2003).
11s See Ahdieh, supra note 76, at 2095.
116 See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 101, at 1048 (noting that dialectical federalism
arises from divergent legal interpretations of Supreme Court decisions).

52

18 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 31 (2013)

likely to be even more true, in everything from the sources of law to their
substance, across national borders and between supranational and national
tribunals. In transnational interactions, consequently, the presence of some
commonality of law and norms may consequently be as critical a factor as
the existence of diverse perspectives, if engagement is to be meaningful. 117
In the human rights setting, for example, some commitment to universal
human rights is likely a necessary prerequisite to interaction.118
Diversity of institutional perspective, meanwhile, turns on differences in
political perspective and context.
"Utopian" versus "pragmatic"
perspectives on rights constitute a relevant example." 9 Akin to the federal
habeas courts in Cover and Aleinikoff s account, a supranational tribunal
may be more likely to evaluate human rights concerns in the abstract, asking
whether a basic right protected under the relevant treaty has been
infringed. 12 By contrast, a national court-and perhaps especially a lower
court-might take into account an array of pragmatic concerns "foreign" to
the supranational tribunal.121 The prevailing political landscape of the
country, the surrounding judicial culture, and other factors may also inform
the national court's perspective.122
Such diversity of institutional
perspective can significantly enrich the engagement among courts in
intersystemic adjudication.
In the presence of such diversity of perspective, intersystemic
adjudication may provide a means to foster creativity in judicial lawmaking,
to promote learning, and to avoid error. But it may also be a vehicle for
something deeper: a change in values. By unavoidably engaging and
attending to the work of a distinct system of courts and its associated body of
jurisprudence, each court will find itself exposed to distinct perspectives and
values, with some internalization of those values a likely result. With such
internalization, in turn, should come some evolution in values across the
courts engaged in intersystemic adjudication.
Intersystemic adjudication thus aspires to change values, but in a way
that is less deterministic, and perhaps less uni-directional, than has

"

See generally ROBERT C. STALNAKER, CONTEXT AND CONTENT 48-49 (1999) (discussing

the relationship between commonality and particularity in dialogue).
118 See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALEL.J. 273, 364-65 (1997).
11 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 101, at 1050.
120 See Ahdieh, supra note 76, at
2153-54.
121 See id at 2096-97.
122 id.

Toward a JurisprudenceofFree Expression in Russia

53

commonly been posited.123 Further, it recognizes not merely the reality, but
the affirmative value, of some greater degree of compulsion in the
engagement of otherwise independent courts-in certain settings. Through a
balance of the latter with a horizontal dynamic of judicial comity and
dialogue, intersystemic adjudication offers a better prospect for an evolution
in each system's norms and values. As to the freedom of expression in
Russia, a dynamic of intersystemic adjudication between the ECHR and the
Russian lower courts promises just the shift away from the legal values
inherited from the Soviet Union that is needed by the country today.
IV. INTERSYSTEMIC ADJUDICATION, THE ECHR, AND RUSSIA'S LOWER
COURTS

Among alternative frameworks for thinking about the interaction of the
ECHR with Russia's lower courts, intersystemic adjudication comes closest
to capturing the dynamic at work today. This is not to say that reality aligns
perfectly with that framework. To the contrary, as we will suggest, key steps
might be taken to enhance the quality, and hence the ultimate benefits, of
intersystemic adjudication in that setting. By engaging both the ways in
which the structure of that relationship already lends itself to intersystemic
adjudication, and those by which it might more fully do so, we can begin to
discern a path to the increased protection of free expression in Russia.
a.

Indicators oflntersystemic Adjudication

As described above, intersystemic adjudication is ultimately rounded
Such
in the interdependence of otherwise independent court systems.
interdependence is precisely the dynamic that operates between the ECHR
and the Russian lower courts, given their overlapping jurisdiction and
inability to accomplish their respective missions without the cooperation of
one another.
Their jurisdictions overlap at least implicitly, if not explicitly, in their
engagement with the scope of individuals' rights of free expression. The
lower courts hear cases involving individuals who are being prosecuted for
exercising their rights of free expression, who have asserted those rights by
way of defense, or who have suffered harm or injury because of such
expression. Where those rights go unprotected, in turn, the ECHR acquires
jurisdiction to hear the claims of those same individuals and to provide

23
124

See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 7.
See supra Part III.C.
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appropriate remedies.1 25
Further, the ECHR and Russia's lower courts would each be hardpressed to achieve their goals without cooperation from the other. Where
Russian courts fail to protect rights dictated by the European Convention,
they can minimally expect aggrieved litigants to seek relief from the ECHR
and to receive monetary compensation for that failure.126 Further, they may
face pushback from national authorities obliged to cover the cost of such
compensation. Finally, they may ultimately face directives from the ECHR
to reopen relevant proceedings or otherwise to give relief to relevant
claimants-undermining their decisions, or at least denying them finality.
Yet the ECHR is no less dependent on the Russian lower courts.
Enforcement of the ECHR's judgments in individual cases falls largely to
the national courts.127 More broadly, disregard of the ECHR's decisions in
the Russian lower courts explains much of the flood of cases in which the
ECHR is drowning.128 If it is to get its docket in order and manage it in the
future, then, the ECHR is dependent on the assistance of those courts.
Beyond their interdependence, the presence of alternative legal
perspectives between the ECHR and Russia's lower courts could not be
clearer. Regarding diversity of law, each relies on dramatically different
sources of law and methods of interpretation, from the European Convention
and international norms to the Russian Constitution and national legal rules
and interpretations. Yet the requisite commonality is also present. The
Russian Constitution, to begin, incorporates the European Convention. 129
Beyond that, important aspects of due process and human rights are
explicitly enshrined in that text, however often they might fail to be upheld
1 130
in practice.
Diversity of institutional context is equally apparent. Generally,
domestic courts are more prone than international tribunals to approach law
from a pragmatic perspective. 13 1 This may be especially true in the human
rights arena, where domestic courts must look to the political and practical

See Smith, supra note 34, at 518-25.
See Dernovsky, supra note 30, at 489 (explaining how Russia frequently pays monetary
judgments ordered by the ECHR).
127 See generally Dernovsky, supra note 30, at 485-91.
128 See Helfer, supra note 7 (discussing the huge backlog of cases facing
the court).
129 See KONSTITUTSIIA RossIISKOl FEDERATSII [KoNST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15 (Russ.).
125

126

130 Id. arts. 17-64.

' See Ahdieh, supra note 76 at 2096-97 (discussing the utopian and pragmatic approaches
of courts).
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implications of protecting human rights.132
The dynamic between the ECHR and Russia's lower courts is fully
consistent with this pattern. For the Russian courts, declaring that the
government has impinged upon the freedom of expression may have
challenging political, social, and even fiscal implications. Against the
backdrop of recent Russian history, perceived national security concerns,
and gross disparities in wealth, the Russian courts seem likely to bring to the
table a distinct set of expectations and assumptions, by comparison with the
ECHR. Add to that a distinct culture of law and conception of its role, as
described in Part I, and diversity of institutional context could not be
stronger.
Interdependence, jurisdictional overlap, and contrasting perspectives,
then, are clearly present in the relationship of the ECHR and the Russian
lower courts. What about the blend of vertical and horizontal interaction that
is also essential to intersystemic adjudication? As suggested above, the
ECHR enjoys some meaningful degree of power vis-A-vis the Russian
courts. At a minimum, with its adjudication of disputes previously heard in
those courts, the ECHR has the capacity to force a conversation around
freedom of expression and human rights more broadly in Russia. Yet its
power vis-A-vis the Russian lower courts does not end there.
The Russian government has shown sensitivity to international critique
of its human rights practices. 133 A pattern of adverse ECHR judgments
arising from a particular lower court, or even a particular practice of the
lower courts, might thus generate pressure on the lower courts to adjust their
practices. Even absent any such sensitivity, the pure volume of ECHR
litigation directed toward Russia and the country's attendant fiscal exposure
gives the ECHR's decision-making a certain kind of "appellate" force.
Complaints against Russia make up 20 percent to 28 ercent of the ECHR's
The Court has ruled
cases each year-more than any other member state.
135
against Russia, meanwhile, in 94 percent of those cases.
Finally, even
132 See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Balancing Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in
an Age of Terrorism,47 COLUM. J.TRANSANT'L L. 6 (discussing the balancing of security and
civil liberties).
133 See, e.g., Eleanor Bindman, Russia's Response to the EU's Human Rights Policy,
1, 2010), http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/eleanorOPENDEMOCRACY
(Oct.
bindman/russia's-response-to-eu's-human-rights-policy (noting Putin's increasing hostility
towards being lectured by the international community regarding human rights).
134 Lapitskaya, supra note 47, at 486-87.
13 Violation by Article and by State:
1959-2011, EUR. CT. HUM. RTs.,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats-violation_1959_2011_ENG.pdf (last visited Sept.
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beyond the administrative and fiscal impact of this volume of adverse
judgments, the ECHR's decisions can be understood to constitute a kind of
appellate "reversal" of the lower courts, whether in forcing actual revision of
a decision, prompting a grant of relief in the higher courts, encouraging a
change in law, or even simply denying finality to the lower court's
judgment.
Some vertical element of interaction, then, can be seen in the
engagement of the ECHR and Russia's lower courts. The horizontal element
of judicial dialogue and comity, by contrast, is more elusive. As we will
suggest in the following section, though, enhanced horizontal engagement
presents a viable opportunity for future development of the relationship.
The necessary predicate for horizontal dialogue already exists. Given
their interdependence, the ECHR cannot fulfill its aspirations for human
rights protection in Russia without the cooperation of the lower courts.
Cooperative dialogue is therefore necessary for the ECHR. Such dialogue is
also essential for the lower courts, for the reasons already suggested. The
Russian courts thus stand to benefit from meaningful engagement and
coordination with the ECHR, given their own priorities and pursuits.
Notwithstanding this potential for horizontal engagement, however, it
has not been characteristic of the interaction to date, between the ECHR and
the Russian lower courts. This is evident when we consider the various
forms such interaction might take. Minimally, each group of judges could
take into consideration the decisions of the other.
Russian courts
considering cases involving the prosecution of political speech or public
protest might look to ECHIR decisions directed to just those questions-in
the specific context of Russia. Likewise, the ECHR, in adjudicating disputes
involving Russia, might undertake to make itself aware of relevant principles
of Russian constitutional law and due process, as reflected in jurisprudence
and judicial practice of the Russian courts. However rudimentary, this
would constitute an important step toward meaningful engagement.
Going a step further, each might find occasion to make affirmative
reference to the aforementioned sources in their own decisions. Such
explicit citation goes beyond mere consideration.136 But it need not entail
any obligation to agree. Simply by engaging explicitly with one another's
judgments, the ECHR and the Russian courts might plant the seeds of a

27, 2013).
136 Cover and Aleinikoff also observed this type of interaction in habeas cases,
where
federal courts cited state court decisions and vice versa, allowing both to contribute to the
development of due process jurisprudence. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 101, at 1052.
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pattern of intersystemic engagement, in which each begins to learn from the
other.
Such a practice of citation to one another's judgments has the potential
to change the relationship between the courts significantly. By highlighting
the voluntary qualities present in their interaction, it may help reduce
resistance to dissemination of the values of the European Convention-even
if infused with Russian characteristics.137 More ambitiously, one can
imagine such mutual citation as suggesting the existence of a shared
project-with varying methods and even values, to be sure, but shared
nonetheless.1 38 And with that, one might plausibly overcome not only the
Russian courts' affirmative resistance to the ECHR, but perhaps also their
more pernicious indifference to it.
Neither mutual citation to one another's judgments nor even mere
engagement with them, however, characterizes the current dynamic of
interaction between the ECHR and the Russian lower courts.
If
intersystemic adjudication is to generate progress toward the freedom of
expression in Russia, this must be a particular focus.
b.

EnhancingIntersystemic Adjudication

If intersystemic adjudication has the potential to help alter the values of
free expression in Russia, it is useful to consider what further innovations
might help to close the gaps in its implementation, and thereby encourage its
further development. Most particularly, how might a horizontal dynamic of
engagement be more systematically encouraged?
To begin, the aforementioned practices of considering and even citing
relevant judgments of the countervailing courts should be actively
encouraged. At a minimum, the ECHR should make a point of increasing its
knowledge of Russian rules and procedures. And in appropriate cases,
citation to relevant Russian authority might be expected to go a long way.
Beyond these preliminary steps, it will be important to increase the
persuasive quality of the ECHR's judgments. Those judgments already
achieve the vertical dimension of intersystemic adjudication, as exercises of
the ECHR's effective power.1 39 What needs greater attention is their
See Weiler, supra note 87 (elaborating on the resistance an exercise of appellate power
by the ECJ would have on E.U. member states).
38 See Burkov, supra note 48, at 35 (lamenting that such mutual citation is not yet present
in Russian courts).
39 For a discussion of the vertical and horizontal aspects of intersystemic
adjudication, see
supra Part III.C.
137
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rhetorical framing-the primary source of their horizontal, dialogic
contribution to intersystemic adjudication. It is such framing that gives
ECHR judgments the potential to persuade, and not simply to impose.
Careful attention must therefore be paid to the crafting of ECHR opinions,
with the lower courts in Russia (at least in appropriate cases) among the
Court's most critical audiences.
Mere persuasion, however, is insufficient. It is equally important for
ECHR judgments to be clear and specific in their remedial directives. For
many years, the ECHR did not even consider itself competent to offer any
remedy in its judgments.140 While it has since moved away from that view,
the Court must go further in engaging questions of how Russia's courtsand particularly the lower courts-might execute relevant judgments of the
ECHR. Article 13 of the Convention requires the ECHR to provide an
effective remedy.141 In reality, however, the most important determinant of
efficacy may be the articulation of specific remedies to guide the response of
Russia's lower courts. 142
Careful framing of the binding effect of ECHR interpretations of the
Convention in national courts may also help promote more robust lower
court engagement with judgments of the Court. Without prejudice to the
ECHR's ultimate authority to impose its interpretation, some invitation to
flexibility may be appropriate.143 Instead of insisting on imposing its own
interpretations as to each detail, a preferable approach might be more
flexible in nature. By inviting the lower courts to join with the ECHR in
defining the demands of the European Convention, the Court might give the
lower courts a sense of investment in that project. Even further, the ECHR
might seek to link its interpretation of the Convention with the Russian
courts' interpretations of the Russian constitution. In this way, lower courts
might gradually begin to shift away from a natural tendency to rely on
domestic, as opposed to international, interpretations of the demands of free
expression.
140
141
142

See Helfer, supra note 7, at 146.
Convention, supra note 32, art. 13.
See Helfer, supra note 7, at 150, 153-55.

As Helfer pointed out, a former ECHR judge explains there is:
[A] difference between the Convention as part of the constitution and the
Convention as an international treaty interpreted by the ECHR. Within the
domestic legal order, the Convention is only one element in the mosaic of
different constitutional provisions and its interpretation in that context may
differ considerably from an interpretation based on the Convention alone.
Helfer, supra note 7, at 137.
143
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Returning to the mutual citation of judicial authority, a potential
technique by which the ECHR can encourage the Russian lower courts to
reference its opinions is offered by Protocol 14. Under Protocol 14, the
ECHR can promulgate certain rules for dismissal.144 One possible rule, as
proposed by Helfer, would prohibit such dismissal where the national court
failed to consider relevant ECHR judgments and interpretations.1 45 Thus, if
a lower court aims to avoid having its judgments overturned by the ECHR, a
natural step would be to confront relevant decisions of the Court.
Taking this possibility a step further, one might imagine a mechanism
by which lower courts could seek advisory opinions from the ECHR.146 As
in the case of the preliminary reference procedure by which sub-national
courts in the European Community engaged the European Court of
Justice,1 47 a device of this sort might be especially useful in fostering a biTailored to a specific factual
directional pattern of engagement.
circumstance, the dialogue inherent in such advisory review may be
especially useful. The internalization of ECHR values becomes all but
inevitable in such an interaction.
Adoption of such a proposal may be difficult to envision as an
immediate matter. In the various ways outlined above, however, a pattern of
recurrent, low-stakes engagement between the ECHR and the Russian lower
courts will begin to build a dynamic of intersystemic adjudication. And in
that way, it can help to foster the protection of free expression in Russia.
CONCLUSION

Ultimately, what impact can we expect to arise from a more robust
dynamic of intersystemic adjudication between the ECHR and the lower
courts of Russia? As suggested above, a narrow and instrumental
conception of law, of its role, and of its capacity may be an important cause
of the weak protection of free expression in Russia today. Especially among
Russia's lower court judges, before whom much of the day-to-day battle
over free expression is fought, a change of mindset is therefore essential.

144 See Council of Europe, Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, May. 13,
2004, C.E.T.S. No. 194.
145See Helfer, supra note 7, at 153.
146This reform was first proposed by the "Group of Wise Persons" in 2006. See id. at 151.
In their recommendation, however, they proposed (unwisely) that such access only be given
to high courts. See id
147See Breyer, supranote 63, at 1049.
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Such a change in thinking will not come easily. Nor will it come by
force. Rather, it requires the gradual, yet systematic, engagement of those
courts with the values of free expression that have come to stand among the
universal rights and liberties enjoyed by all. Intersystemic adjudication
between the Russian lower courts and the European Court of Human
Rights-perhaps the leading institutional repository of those values-offers
an avenue for such engagement.
In recognizing their mutual interdependence-as defined by the
elements of both hierarchical power and judicial comity present in their
interaction-the ECHR and Russia's lower courts may begin to better attend
to the other. As they do so, the prospect of mutual learning, and even
cultural change, becomes possible. Once established in the courts, those
aspirations may ultimately be realized more broadly.

